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j 
_I 
I 
JN THE FIRST JUDICI/>.L DISTRICT COURT 
OF Cl\CHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN GOSSNER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
UTJ\ll PONER AND LIGHT, a Utah ) 
corporation, THE STATE OF UTAH,) 
by and through its Division ) 
of State Lands, } 
Defendants. ) ) 
0 RD ER 
Case No. 16062 
The above captioned matter came on for hearir;g on 
motions this 19th day of June, 1979, plaintiffs appearing by, 
through their attorneys, Robert C .. Huntley, Jr., and Gordon J, 
Low, and defendant, Utah Power and Light, appearing through i: 
attorneys, Albert J. Colton and Anthony L. Rampton, and defoi 
State of Utah, appearing through its attorney, Hichael M. Quea: 
and the Court having considered the briefs and arguments of c: 
enters its Order on motions as follows: 
(1) The State of Utah is hereby dismissed from the 
action without prejudice. 
(2) The Court rules as a matter of law that the on: 
0 
u 
liability of the defendant, if any, will be limited to floodi: 
Fl 
resulting from the filling of the river channel with silt if 
. }': 
caused by the erection of the Cutler Dam; and that the de~eni t; 
will be liable absolutely for damages occasioned thereby. In b,, 
other words, the tort cormni t ted by the Utah Power and Light 
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company, if any, for which it may be liable to the plaintiffs is 
the blocking of the channel of the Bear River by silt caused by 
the erection of the Cutler Dam. 
The Court further rules as a matter of law that with 
regard to the release of waters the standard of care imposed upon 
the defendant is established by the Kimball and Dietrich decrees, 
and inasm~ch as it is stipulated that such releases have never 
exceeded 5,500 cfs, there is no liability of the defendant eithe~ 
in absolute liability or in negligence because of release 9f 
water £rom Oneida Dam. 
(3) IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment 
by Ut2.h I'ower & Light as against all plaintiffs on the ground that 
the statute of limitations is a bar to the plaintiffs' claim be, 
and hereby is, denied as made. The Court holds as a matter of 
la\.; that the three year statute of limitations (which is ,applic-
able to plaintiffs' claims) began to run from the date when the 
ch:i.nnel of the Bear River was filled with silt (caused by the 
erection of the Cutler Dam) so as to cause flooding of the 
adjacent farm land of plaintiffs. 
(4) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the !-lotion for Summary 
Judgment by Utah Power & Light Company as against all plaintiffs 
, on the basis of rights under the Idaho Dietrich Decree and the 
Ut~h Kimball Decree be, and hereby is denied as made. IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs' .Motion to Stri~c Utah Power's 
first Claim for Relief (which claim asserts that Utah Power has 
the right to flood the plaintiffs based on the Kimball Decree) 
b,,, and hereby is gri.lnted. 
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(5) IT IS FURTHER ORDER.ED that plaintiffs' Motion to 
St·ike the Fifth Affirmative Defense of Utah Power and Light 
(said defense being that the land is owned by the St:ate of Utah 
rather than by the plaintiffs) be, and hereby is, granted withc:i 
prejudice on behalf of the State. 
( 6) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the .Motion for Summar:, 
Judgment dismissing with prejudice the complaint of the plaintU 
' Ed Gessner and Josephine Gosiner, on the ground that they and 
their predecessors have heretofore conveyed flood easements~· 
Utah Power ana Light Company be, and hereby is, granted. 
(7) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hotion and Stipula1 
ot the parties to add additional parties plaint.iff and addit~m1. parties counterdefendant be, and hereby is, granted. 
(8) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that th7 Countercla,im of I 
Utah Power and Light for condemnation in eminent domain is di!J 
missed without.prejudice. 
I 
(9) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial date of Jtj 
I 
1979, be, and hereby is, vacated, for the purpos·e of permittir.f 
I 
.party who desires to file notice of interlocutory appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending any interlocutorj! 
appeal, that the parties may proceed with pretrial discovecy. 
DATED this ~day of July, 1979. 
bl 
A.IH. ELLETT, 
___.-; 
RETIRED .JUSTICE 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN GOSSNER and JOSEPHINE GOSSNER 
husband and wife; NORA BAIR; KEN BAIR 
as administrator of estate of Lloyd Bair; 
HOWARD K. BARLOW and DEL MARIE BARLOW 
husband and wife; WILLIAM BECKSTEAD a~d 
ELVIRA BECKSTEAD, husband and wife; BLANCHE 
BIHGHAM; RALPH BINGHAM and JANE BINGHAM 
husband and wife; BARDO M. BODILY and WANDA 
BODILY, husband and wife; ALFRED CHAMBERS 
and MARTHA CHAMBERS, husband and wife; 
RUTH FERRIS as administrator of estate of 
G. Ferris Chambers; LENNIS CHAMBERS; OLEY LLOYD 
COLEY and VERDA COLEY, husband and wife; G. 
ELLIS DOTY; ROBERT h'. GOODWIN and ELNER 
GOODWIN, husband and wife; 
THERON HANSEN and ORIS MAY HANSEN, 
husband and wife, NEFF HARDMAN; HEBER HARDMAN 
and SHIRLEY HARDMAN, husband and wife; VAN 
JENSEN and DOROTHY JENSEN, husband and wife; 
GAIL B. JENSEN and ISABEL JENSEN, husband and 
,,;_ife; NEIL JENSEN and CLAR7' JENSEN, husband 
and wife; ROSS LABRUM and LINTJ;>, LABRUM, husband 
and wife; DUANE LABRUM; ROSS LABRUM; LEE 
LABRUM; ARTHUR D. MAURER and GERALDINE MAURER, 
husband and wife; LaMAR C. NIELSEN, administrator 
of estates of Clayton and Beth Neilsen; STEVE 
BODILY; DON E. SPACKMAN and PAULINE SPACirnAN I 
husband and wife; HAROLD SPACIU!AN and MILLIE 
SPACKMAN, husband and wife; LLOYD BUTTARS and 
VEANA BUTTARS, husband and wife; JAi1ES SPACKHAN 
and VELDA SPACK~!AN, husband and wife; BOB 
SPACKMAN and LINDA SPACKMAN, husband and wife; 
LeROY SPACKMAN and MARY C. SPACK~11-"\N, husband 
and wife; REX SPACKMAN and MILDRED SPACIU'iAN, 
husband and wife; ROSS SPACKMAN, individually, 
and as personal representative of the estate 
of Hyrum Spackman; VAUGHAN B. SPACKMAN and 
RUTH SPACKMAN, husband and wife; C. ROBERT 
TOOLSON and ELOISE TOOLSON, husband and wife; 
C~-\LV/\ Lr v:~~~ OYKE nnd f,a.RE:Lt, VAf1 DYI\E, hushn.ti.(~~ 
""'J w_lf2; hD::O:LC\ERT \.'HEELER 2nd i!TLDA l!HECLEI:, 
husband and wife; LAMONTE WHEELER and NELDA J. 
WHEELER, husband and wife; RAY WHEELER and 
FLORENCE H. WHEELER, husband and wife; HEGAN 
WHE:ELER and JONETTE W!-IEI:LER, husband and wife; 
i 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) CASI: NO. 
) 165S2 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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RUBY WHEELER TRUST; WALLACE W. WISER and ) 
BEATRICE WISER, husband and wife; DAVID WOOD and ) 
CONNIE WOOD, husband and wife; MICHAEL WOOD and ) 
RUTH WOOD, husband and wife; THOMAS WOOD and ) 
CHARLENE WOOD, husband and wife; ELMER WOOD and ) 
LEOLA WOOD, husband and wife; EDITH WOOD ) 
FARNSWORTH; WALTER WOOD and NEDRA S. WOOD, husband ) 
and wife; ROYDON STROBELT; DON SPACKMAN; ) 
MERLIN ANDREWS; CHARLIE WOOD and BETTY JO ) 
WOOD, husband and wife; THEADOR J. ZILLES and ) 
LILLIE ZILLES, husband and wife; RAY ZILLES ) 
and GLENDA ZILLES, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
REBUTTAL (REPLY) BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROH Al~ ORDER OF THE FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
HONORABLE A. H. ELLETT, JUSTICE 
ii 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN GOSSNER, et al, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16592 
REBUTTAL (REPLY) BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEF 
This brief is to present on behalf of the appellant 
Cache Valley farmers their reply or rebuttal to certain 
facts, statements and legal arguments presented by Utah 
Power & Light in its answering (reply) brief. 
Certain of the same issues have been briefed in the 
farmers' response in the companion appeal by Utah Power, 
Case No. 16573, which has been consolidated for oral argu-
ment with this case and, therefore, since our briefing in 
that case will be before the Court, we will attempt not 
to duplicate. 
One procedural matter -- at page 3 of Utah Power's 
brief, the complaint is voiced that we filed the Affidavit 
of Dr. Milligan in opposition to various motions of Utah 
Power & Light on the day of the hearing before Justice 
Ellett. That statement is quite correct, but counsel for 
Utah Power neglect to mention the fact that Utah Power's 
motions were filed and served only one day before the 
hearing. 
The case was set for jury trial on Tuesday, June 19, 
1979, and Utah Power filed most of the motions which bring 
1 
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about this interlocutory appeal and served copies of those 
motions on counsel the preceding day, Monday, June 18th, 
which motions resulted in the loss of the trial date which 
had been established by stipulation of counsel and Court Order 
more than six months before. 
An earlier trial date of October 1978 was lost due to 
the State of Utah intervening in the case (the State ulti-
mately being removed from the case by Justice Ellett), and 
an April 1979 date was lost to the farmers due to Utah 
Power's attorneys being involved in another Federal court 
case. 
PART I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE 
With respect to this issue, Utah Power's Statement of 
the Facts is presented in a way which possibly leads to a 
misstatement of the farmers' position, and that is Utah 
Power's seizing on the farmers' statements in answers to 
interrogatories that the frequency of the flooding has 
rendered their land "totally useless." 
It is not contended that the land is destroyed, and it 
is the fact, as testified to by every farmer in his deposi-
tion, that their bottom ground is some of their most fertile 
ground, and in those years crops are not washed away they 
get excellent crops from those lands. 
In other words, the land is not destroyed, but it is 
only the fact that Utah Power has been flooding the lands 
more frequently in recent years than in the past, and the 
fact that Utah Power will not advise the farmers as to 
whether or not to expect flaodin], results i~ ~om2 f1rrn~c 5 
finding it imprudent to invest money in working of the 
soil and purchase of seed. 
In order that the farmers could make a determination 
for the crop years 1978 and 1979 as t0 whether to plant 
and attempt to mitigate their damages, the follmving interro:, 
2 
.. 
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tory was asked and the following answer given by Utah Power 
& Light for the crop year 1978 (R. 418): 
II INTERROGATORY NO. 1: The Plaintiffs specifically 
request t~e Defendant to answer the following inter-
rogatory in order to assist in attempting to mitigate 
damages for the crop year 1978: 
•
11 
'Please state whether the plaintiffs should 
anticipate that their lands will be flooded 
during the spring, summer and fall of 1978 due 
to discharge of water from the Oneida Darn or the 
backing up of water from the Cutler Reservoir.· 
(This interrogatory is intended to exclude 
quantities of water caused by any natural state of 
the river prior to the installation of the 
Oneida and Cutler Darn.) 111 
11 ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY #1: Defendant objects to the 
form of Interrogatory #1 in that it assumes facts not 
in evidence, is argumentative in nature and asks for 
defendant to speculate as to events beyond its control. 
(a) Defendant does not know what plaintiffs should--
anticipate; 
(b) Defendant does not know what plaintiffs mean 
by 'flood.' 
(c) Defendant denies any flooding has occurred 
'due to discharge of water from the Oneida Darn or 
the backing up of water from the Cut~.er reservoir.'" 
For the crop year 1979 the same interrogatory was served, and 
Utah Power again refused to respond with a definitive answer 
and simply filed an objection reading as follows (R. 505) : 
"Defendant Utah Power and Light objects to the undated 
interrogatory served upon it by mail.on April 24, 1~79 
because it assumes a fact not established by the evi-
dence, which this defendant denies, to-wit: that . 
mere discharqe of water from the Oneida Dam or backing 
uo of water from the Cutler Reservoir is the cause ot 
a~y flooding to property claimed by plaintiffs." 
Since Utah Power would give no assurances that it would 
cease the discharging of water from the Oneida Darn in greater 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'I 1, 
amounts than the river channel would carry, many of the 
farmers felt it would be irresponsible to attempt to plant 
their lands during those two surn,~ers. The fact is that 
Utah Power did control most of the flooding as to most of 
the farms in those two years, thus proving that the 
flooding is not a permanent, necessary adjunct to the 
operation of the system but that, rather, the flooding is 
in the category of a "continuous or abatable nature" in 
the context of the HAYES case, as opposed to being a 
permanent injury. The HAYES case is quoted at pages 12 
and 13 of our Opening Brief. 
At page 6 of the Utah Power & Light brief, O'NEIL v. 
SAN PEDRO, L.A. & S.L.R.CO., 38 Utah 475, 114 P. 12 (1911), 
is cited for the proposition that the Utah Power dams, 
like the San Pedro Railroad, are permanent structures and 
a continuing enterprise and, therefore, the injuries are 
permanent, causing the statute of limitations to conunence 
when the railroad [dam] is built. 
The SAN PEDRO case is clearly distinguishable from 
the instant case for the following reasons: 
(a) The Court, in SAN PEDRO, properly found 
that the continued operation of the railroad would 
always result in vibrating the nearby house even 
when the railroad was operated in a proper and 
usual manner. 
(b) In the instant case, there is no necessity 
of operating the Bear River at such discharges of 
water from Oneida that the capacity of the natural 
channel is exceeded~ 
(c) Certainly, even in the SAN PEDRO case, the 
Court would not have gone so far as to hold that the 
railroad could, at its convenience and without pay-
ment or compensation for the land, run its tracks 
4 
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and its trains through the front yard of the plaintiff's 
home -- likewise, it is ridiculous in the instant case 
for Utah Power to assert that it can run its water 
at will outside the natural channel and over and 
across the farmers' lands without either condemning 
the lands or purchasing the lands. 
Utah Power next cites JOHNSON v. UTAii·-IDAHO CEHT. RY. CO., 
68 Utah 309, 249 P. 1036 (1926), at page 7 of its brief, 
for the same purpose as the SAN PEDRO RZ\ILROAD case. The 
UT.Z\H-IDAHO CENTPJ\L RAILROAD case is distinguishable for 
precisely the same reasons as discussed above relative to 
the SAN PEDRO RAILROAD case. 
Utah Power quotes at page 8 of its brief that portion 
of HAYES v. ST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO., 117 Mo. App. 201, 162 
S.h'. 266 (1913), which holds that where the structure is 
permanent an<l causes a perma~ent flooding, the action is 
singular and the statute of li~itations bars it where the 
injuries are permanent. 
Utah Power, in quoting to this Court thci.t portion of 
the HAYES case, followed exactly the same tactic it did 
before Justice Ellett by omitting to apprise either this 
Court or Justice Ellett of the following wording contained 
on the same page (p. 268) of the Southwestern Reporter: 
" .•. but where the nuisance is of a continuing 
(abatable) nature, each continuance gives rise to a 
new cause of action, and successive actions may be 
maintained for the damages accruing from time to time . 
. Nuisance consisting of acts done, or particular 
uses of property, 8ay be properly termetl 'continui~g' 
rl'1h2n they n.rl~ such a chardcte.r that ~>ey 0ay c:ontir~ue 
indefinitely, or, on the other hand, Day be dis-
continued at any time." (Emphasis supplied) 
The fact that Utah Power was able to stop the flooding 
during t!-te last three years is, at least, prirna facie 
5 
-~ ... 
I 
.I 
;1 
I 
.l 
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evidence that the injury is abatable and subject to dis-
continuation rather than permanent. 
'i'he Court, in HAYES, quotes with approval from CARSON 
v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, 53 Mo. App. 289, the following 
language: 
" . When the nuisance or cause of the injury may 
be removed or remedied at any tiDe, the measure of 
damages is the actual damage sustained up to the date 
of the institution of the suit. Da~ages accruing 
subsequently must be recovered in successive actions." 
That, of course, is the situation here. The historical 
abatement illustrates this. 
The record clearly establishes that Utah Power was 
granted license through the Dietrich and Kimball Decrees 
to discharge water through the natural channel of the Bear 
River. The record also shows that Utah Power has within 
its power the ability to control the discharges at Oneida 
to keep its water within the natural c~annel. 
Drawing a further parallel from the 3Jl.YES case, in 
HAYES the defendant railroad was given li_cense to build a 
railroad embankr:ient which did begin backing up water to 
a certain level, and the Court properly held that that 
embankment was not, in and of itself, a nuisance. 
In the instant case, Utah Power & Light was given 
authorization for three actions in question in this case: 
(1) to build Cutler Reservoir; 
(2) to build Oneida Dam and Reservoir; and 
(3) to run water between the two of them through 
the natural channel. 
is beyond t.he scope of its license ar,d, thecefore, is an 
abatable nuisance, and any running of waters outside the 
natural channel is a proper basis for damage compensation 
whenever it occurs. 
6 
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Utah Power next, at page 9, quotes KONECNY v. UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 388 F. 2d 59 (8th Cir. 1967), in 
support of its position that the statute of limitations 
would run at the time Utah Power's darns were built. 
Again, KONECNY is distinguishable in that it involved 
flooding to the plaintiff's lands which were inundated 
by a reservoir when the reservoir reached its designed lake 
level, the court holding that that lake level was a part 
of the permanent design of the system. 
In the instant case, the pernanent design of the 
system neither authorizes nor requires that more water 
be run through the Cache Valley than the natural channel 
will hold. 
The DICKINSON case cited at page 9 of Utah Power & 
Light's brief is distinguishable on the same basis. 
DICKS IN SON is further dis'::.ir..guisl'~able in that, in DICKINSON, _____ _ 
the fertility of the lar.ds was destroyed the year after 
the dam was built, but in the instant case the lands still 
have their fertility and value for raising crops whenever 
Utah Power abides by the limit of its license by keeping its 
waters in the natural channel. 
At pages 9, 10 and 11, Utah Power quotes from the 
Georgia case of SMITH v. DALLAS UTILITY CO., 107 S.E. 381 
(Ga. 1921), which, again, is clearly distinguishable from 
the instant situation. The recitation of facts in DP.LLAS 
UTILITY COMPANY states: 
"The dam was built of concrete and was 30 or 40 
feet high, there was no way to orevent the bank in 
question from being overflowed ~xcept by destroying 
the dara. The darn was p~operly constr11cted and 
maintained." 
Such is quite different than the instant case, where the 
causative factor is not the height of the Cutler Dam, or 
f · +- ~ Oneida Dam, the factor even the presence o tne ups_reab 
· a· · , b ' the d' scharge of :more causing the floe ing simp~y e~ng - ~ 
7 
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water than the natural channel of the Bear River can carry, 
which factor is abatable and controllable by Utah Power & 
Light. 
The DALLAS UTILITY COMPANY case goes on to state 
what would be the rule of law under the facts of the 
instant case: 
"While it is true that every continuance of a nui-
sance not permanent and which can and should be 
abated, is a fresh nuisance for which a new action 
will lie (citation omitted), the facts of the 
instant case fail to bring it under that well 
settled rule of law." 
The court then noted that the reason the Georgia case 
did not come within the latter rule of law was that the 
height of the dam was authorized and, therefore, not a 
nuisance, and the flooding was not abatable with the water 
at that level. 
In the instant case, exceeding the banks of the 
natural channel is not authorized and, therefore, is a 
nuisance, and exceeding that channel is abatable simply by 
using care and discretion in the release of waters at 
Oneida, and, thus, the statute of limitations commences to 
run with each new flooding and the case should be remanded 
to be tried under that principle of law. 
Utah Power & Light takes an interesting position at 
pages 11 and 12 of its brief: 
" . it is clear that Justice Ellett's in limine 
ruling in this regard is correct - i.e., the statute 
of limitations began to run from the time the erection 
of the Cutler dam initially caused the flooding. 
"Appellants obviously deny there is any causation 
at all between Cutler Dam Jnd the flooding of 
appellants' lands, and, of course, are only conceding 
this arguendo for purposes of the statute of limita-
tions. If no causation is proved there would be no 
liability in any event." 
8 
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Utah Power, in Section B of its Argument on the statute 
of limitations question, at pages 12 through 15, misstates 
the record when it states that the two dams have been in 
operation for more than 50 years, and that: 
"The facts are undisputed that the manner and 
method of their operation has been unaltered since 
their inception, both as to the amount of water 
released from the upper darn [Oneida] and as to 
the water level of the reservoir behind the lower 
dam [Cutler]." (Emphasis supplied) 
The fact is that the method of operation of Oneida has changed, 
and that fact is set out in the Affidavit of Dr. Milligan 
attached to our Opening Brief as Appendix "B". 
Dr. Milligan specifically stated that his studies 
of the discharges from Oneida discloses that the difference 
between the flooding and nonflooding years is explained by 
the relatively longer periods of time of high level dis-
charges during the flood years. 
(In other words, Dr. Milligan conducted "time-duration curve" 
studies based on Utah Power & Light's own discharge reports.) 
Dr. Milligan's testimony is that there has been a 
change in operation and, thus, Utah Power's assertion that 
the operation has been unaltered since the inception of 
the dams at page 13 is untrue. 
PART II. THE ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
THE EFFECT OF THE KIMBALL AND DIETRICH DECREES 
The farmers have certified as an issue on this appeal 
the fact that Justice Ellett's Order is in error when he 
holds that the Kimball and Dietrich Decrees permit the 
discharge of 5,500 cfs of water through the Cache Valley 
in Utah. 
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we have quoted the Kimball and Dietrich Decrees 
extensively in both our Opening Brief in this action and 
at pages 4 through 8 of our Answering Brief in the compan-
ion appeal, Civil #16573. 
Additionally, the pertinent portions of both the 
Kimball and Dietrich Decrees have been appended to both 
Briefs. 
We have specifically presented to the Court those 
portions of the Decrees which state that the 5,500 cfs 
figure is an authorization to collect that amount of flood 
waters at Bear Lake, and have further specifically quoted 
all of the portions of both Decrees which provide that the 
license to discharge is only through the natural channel. 
Utah Power treats this issue at pages 19 through 22 
of its brief, and nowhere does it ever point out any errors 
in the citations to the actual Decrees we have provided, 
and nowhere does it quote any portion of the Decrees that 
ever states authority for Utah Power to discharge 5,500 
cfs through the Cache Valley. 
The position taken by Utah Power that it can dis-
charge 5,500 cfs even though that volume overflows the 
natural channel through Cache Valley to the extent of 
2,100 cfs (Affidavit of Dr. Milligan, page 2), certainly 
appears to be somewhat absurd. 
Perhaps the position of the parties in this case 
can be best illustrated by taking an extreme example: 
Suppose, instead of the Bear River channel being only 
partially filled with silt, it became 100% full of 
silt so that there wa::; nowhere for the water to run 
where the natural chann:c•l h'lcJ be<'·:-i 
-- would anyone suppose that under that circumstance 
Utah Power & Light would be able to move over to 
another area in the Cache Valley and run its water 
down through not only the plaintiff farmers' lands, 
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but a~so through the properties of the people in 
the City of Logan, to get its water from Oneida to 
Cutler, simply because the Kimball and Dietrich 
Decrees gave it the right to discharge waters from 
Bear Lake for electricity generating purposes at 
all times of the year? 
We submit that Judge Kimball and Judge Dietrich spoke 
advisedly and with precision when they authorized the dis-
charge only through the natural channel, because they 
fully recognized that they were not hearing a suit for 
eminent domain to condemn any new river channels, but were 
simply involved in a suit for the adjudication of water 
rights. 
We request that the remand contain directions to the 
Trial Court to amend its Order to provide that the maximum 
discharge allowable through the Cache Valley area is that 
which can be contained by the natural channel rather than 
the figure of 5,500 cfs. 
PART III. THE ERROR IN DENYING RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE 
AS TO NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE OF WATERS FROM ONEIDA 
DAM 
This issue is really covered by the briefing relative to 
Issues I and II. 
Simply stated, plaintiffs' engineering investigation 
establishes that one of the major causes of the flooding 
is the negligent manner in which Utah Power discharges 
water from Oneida Darn at widely fluctuating volumes and 
with volumes at such time durations as to make it inevi-
table that the banks of the natural channel through th8 
Cache Valley would be breached. 
This issue is plead, the fluctuations are testified 
to in the depositions of at least 15 of the plaintiff 
farmers, and Dr. Milligan's Affidavit sets forth the result 
of his computer studies of the actual discharge data. 
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Strangely enough, in face of that testimony in the recor 
as to the negligent operation of Oneida, the Trial court has 
ruled (prior to hearing any evidence) that he will not hear 
any evidence as to the negligent operation of Oneida. We 
know of no legal precedent for the court's stating it will 
not take evidence on a negligence issue when that negligence 
has been properly plead and is being offered through 
competent, admissible testimony. 
Clearly, the Order of the Trial Court should be re-
versed in this regard and the Court should be ordered to 
permit introduction of competent testimony on that very 
proper issue. 
PART IV. THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFFS EDWIN AND 
JOSEPHINE GOSSNER 
The Utah Power brief, in Part III on the issue of 
summary judgment of dismissal granted against Edwin and 
Josephine Gassner, raises no legal issue by way of the 
citations therein set forth other than Utah Power's 
incorrect assertion at both pages 26 and 27 that we are 
dealing with a situation where there has been no change or 
fluctuation in the manner of the operation. 
There has been both an increase in the volume of 
water discharged and an increase in the frequency of dis-
charge onto the Gassner farm. Both the matter of the 
increase of the burden of the flood easement and the 
negligent abuse of the f'lood easement (by the Lick of care 
in the time duration level of discharges from Oneida) are 
jury questions, and the Trial Court's attempt to dispose 
of those factual, disputed issues on summary judgment 
violates both the spirit and intent of Rule 56. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the 
Trial Court as to the issues presented on this appeal be 
reversed, and that the remand provide: 
(1) That the statute of limitations as to damage to 
crops commences at the time of each successive 
injury to the crops; 
(2) That plaintiffs be permitted to present testim9ny 
as to the causative effect of the operation of the 
Oneida Dam (and the discharges therefrom) on the 
flooding which they have experienced. 
(3) That the Court be directed that the Kimball and 
Dietrich Decrees permit discharges in the Cache 
Valley section of the Bear River by Utah Power 
up to and not exceeding the capacity of the 
natural channel, and not up to the limit of 
5,500 cfs, as erroneously determined by the 
Trial Court. 
(4) That the dismissal of the claims of Edwin and 
Josephine Gessner on summary judgment be re-
versed, with directions to the Court to present 
the factual questions of: 
(a) increase of the burden of the flood easement; 
and 
(b) negligent abuse of the flood easement; 
to the jury. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
RACINE, HUNTLEY & OLSON 
By~-,--..,----,-:::--:;;:-:-::--;:-;;:::-:;-----:;::-~~­Robert C. Huntley, Jr. 
HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW 
By~~~,..-----,--::--~~~~~~­
Gordon J. Low 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
were mailed to Albert J. Col t<;>n, 800 Continental Bank Buildinj' 
231 E. 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 5th day 
of December, 1979, in an envelope with sufficient postage 
prepaid thereon. 
Robert C. Huntley, Jr. -i 
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" I . f ',= 11 11 " 
· · · t 7s . ur~her <;>rdered that the Motion forU Summar¥= ~·-
Jud~me~t dismi~sing with prejudice the complaint of the 
plaintiffs Edwin Gossner. and Josephine Gossner, on the .. , , ·r.r" 
ground that they and their predecessors have heretofo·r'~ l · ' · ·' 
conveyed fl<;>od easements to Utah Power and Light be 
and hereby is granted." --·············· 
Clor~:. Su,"'l;-c · 2 c~ .. ~f. U:.:'.' 
The issue whether or not an easement has been negligently 
abused or whether the burden on the easement has been wrongfully 
increased is a jury question. 
Utah Power has filed as a "Third Claim for Relief" 
commencing at page 4 of its Amended Answer and Counterclaim, a 
defense as to the plaintiff, Ed Gossner, that the power company 
holds a flood easement on his land and that, therefore, his 
claim is not proper and that, additionally, he is liable for 
attorney's fees and court costs for participating in this 
action. 
The fact is that the Gossner Flood Easement was executed 
on the then existing type of operation of the river in 1953, 
and that operation has changed materially in recent years so 
that it is flooding more of Mr. Gossner's land at different and 
more inconvenient times than existed at the time the easement 
was taken. (Deposition of Edwin Gossner at pp. 48, 50, 62 and 
74) The law is, as established by a Ninth Circuit Court case 
involving Utah Power & Light, that such a flood easement is 
not a defense. 
In GRIFFITH v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO. (1955), 226 F.2d 
661, the Ninth Circuit Court held that even where the power 
company has a perpetual easement, still it may be held liable 
for damages caused by its wrongful or negligent flooding of 
the plaintiff. 
In GRIFFITH, the Ninth Circuit Court overruled a dismissal 
granted by the District Judge on summary judgment, premised on 
the existence of the easements, the Court stating at page 668: 
"Even if defendant had an absolute right, under the 
principle that one must not use even vested pr<;>p:rty 
in such a manner wrongfully or negligently to inJure 
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I~ 
contends that this charge was erroneous and tha~ it 
should be ~xem~t from liability for flood damage to. 
~and on ~hich it held flood easements. we find thiS t' ;5 
instru~tion.to be consistent with the holding of this 
Court in Griffeth '7· Utah Power & Light co., 22ii···P-.?d 
661, 668-6~ (9th ~ir. 1955), which held the same 81H'Eina- c, '1 LC 
ant potentially liable for negligence in causing flood 
damage despite the existence of a flood easement." 
The deposition of Ed Gossner in this case establishes 
that at the time he gave the flood easement, the Utah Power 
& Light representatives advised him that there would be no 
more flooding to be expected on his lands than he had been 
experiencing in previous years. (Gossner Depo. at 38, 82) 
The representative further told him that he could continue 
to use his lands for farming purposes as he had in the past. 
(Gossner Depo. at 73 and 83) 
Mr. Gossner's deposition further establishes that up until 
about 1960 he was making excellent use of his bottomlands, in 
fact, getting two crops a year off of them by planting rye in 
the fall which would be harvested in the spring for silage, 
and then planting on the same ground a corn crop which would 
be harvested later in the fall for silage in fact, it was 
his most valuable ground. (Gessner Depo. at 34-35) 
His deposition further establishes that commencing about 
1960 the power company began to flood his lands to a greater 
and greater extent where, until finally in the 1970's, he was 
unable to rely on planting any of it. (Gossner Depo. at 44, 57, 
67) 
It is a jury question (and certainly not a matter of law 
to be determined before the evidence is in) as to whether the 
increased flooding on Gossner's land is due to negligence of 
Utah Power. 
It is further a jury question as to whether Utah Power 
has increased the burden of the flooding beyond that which 
was contemplated by the parties when the easement was granted. 
The deposition of Mr. Gessner sets up those disputed facts 
(Gossner Depo. at 36-38; 70, 72 and 92), and Mr. Gessner is 
entitled to have that question determined by the jury, 
· d ent being (continued on P· 21) 
with the granting of summary JU gm 
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